

Christian Friedrich Daniel Schubart's *Deutsche Chronik* and the War of American Independence, 1774-1777

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Abstract: This article examines coverage of Britain's conflict with the American colonies in Christian Friedrich Daniel Schubart's popular German-language periodical *Deutsche Chronik* from March 1774 to the beginning of 1777. Schubart was an enthusiastic supporter of the revolutionary movement, which he thought could serve as a model for German-speaking Europeans. However, Britain's use of German troops against the Americans marked a turning point in the way the *Chronik* covered the conflict. It not only resulted in a significant increase in reports about American developments, but also compelled Schubart to introduce alternative interpretations of the Americans' struggle with Britain.

Keywords: Christian F. D. Schubart, *Deutsche Chronik*, War of American Independence, Hessians, German attitudes to North America, auxiliary troops

In 1977 Horst Dippel published *Germany and the American Revolution, 1770-1800*, a groundbreaking study that drew attention to the Revolution's political and intellectual impact on German-speaking Europe.¹ Drawing on a broad range of late eighteenth-century German-language records, Dippel not only demonstrated that German interest in American developments increased dramatically with the outbreak of war, but also showed that the events in North America had a significant political and intellectual impact on German-speaking Europeans. This impact has also been studied by scholars who have examined references to American developments in late eighteenth-century German-language literary works, such as poems, novels and plays.² In contrast, comparatively few studies have addressed the role of German-language political periodicals in the formation of German public opinion about the War of American Independence.³ Dippel himself paid little attention to German-language periodicals, arguing that their 'informational value was generally limited'.⁴

This article seeks to address this gap in the scholarship on the American Revolution by examining coverage of Britain's conflict with the colonies in what has been called the first political periodical in Germany, Christian Friedrich Daniel Schubart's *Deutsche Chronik*.⁵ Launched in the spring of 1774 and published first in Augsburg and then Ulm, two cities in the south-western region of the Holy Roman Empire, the *Chronik* was an unusually provocative and opinionated journal that enjoyed a high degree of popularity throughout German-speaking Europe and beyond. This was in part due to Schubart's bold, witty and engaging style of writing, which appealed to broad segments of the population. Indeed, according to a leading study of the history of the German press, the *Chronik* serves as a 'prime example of the awakening consciousness of a new generation'.⁶

The article focuses on the period from March 1774, when the *Chronik* commenced publication, to the beginning of 1777, when Schubart was arrested and subsequently imprisoned for ten years by Karl Eugen, duke of Württemberg, for violating censorship

laws.⁷ During the three years leading up to his arrest Schubart was an eager observer of and commentator on American developments. In fact, he was the first editor to make North America a central focus of coverage in a German-language periodical.

By focusing on this widely read journal, this article aims to broaden our understanding of German responses to Britain's war with its American colonies. In particular, it argues that a major turning point in the *Chronik's* coverage of the war was Britain's use of as many as 38,000 German troops in its effort to put down the rebellion, in a conflict that seemed of little concern to them and on a continent they knew almost nothing about.⁸ First, the participation of German soldiers in the war resulted in a dramatic increase in the amount of coverage about American developments in German-language publications, including the *Chronik*. More importantly, however, it also had a significant impact on the ways in which Schubart viewed Britain's conflict with its colonies. For Schubart, it posed a serious dilemma. From the outset he was a particularly enthusiastic and optimistic observer of the American revolutionary movement, and he hoped that the Americans would succeed in their quest to free themselves from oppression. He was critical of the use of German soldiers in the American war primarily because he regarded it as an unpatriotic act by German rulers who 'sold' their subjects to fight a foreign ruler's war on a distant continent. And yet, as a German patriot, he wished his German compatriots success on the battlefield. Over the course of 1776, Schubart's view of the American cause became increasingly negative as he struggled to reconcile his German patriotism with his love for liberty.

Schubart's *Chronik* was one of more than 2,000 periodicals, or *Zeitschriften*, that began to appear in German-speaking Europe in the last decades of the eighteenth century. While the main purpose of roughly one-third of them was entertainment, most targeted a specialised audience that was concerned with a certain theme or issue, such as medicine, music, pedagogy or literature.⁹ The *Chronik* belonged to a small but particularly influential kind of periodical, the political review. The first of these journals commenced publication in the 1770s, thus coinciding with the outbreak of the war in America.

Some of these political periodicals aimed to educate German readers about developments in America by printing documentary evidence of a political and historical nature, such as statistics, letters and pamphlets. This category included August Ludwig von Schlözer's well-known journals, the two *Briefwechsel* and the *Stats-Anzeigen*, published between 1775 and 1793. In addition, Daniel Ebeling's *Amerikanische Bibliothek*, which he edited from 1777 to 1778, informed German readers about American affairs primarily by printing translations of American documents related to the revolution. However, more important in reflecting German attitudes towards the American Revolution were popular periodicals that included not just factual information and news but also commentary and opinion. They included the *Teutscher Merkur*, first published in 1773 by fellow *Sturm und Drang* poet Christoph Martin Wieland, Wilhelm Ludwig Wekhrlin's *Chronologen*, which first appeared in 1774, and, finally, Schubart's *Chronik*. These journals served as major sources of information about American developments at a time when most Germans knew little about this distant land and its people.

Among these political periodicals the *Chronik* stands out as particularly popular, in part because it was accessible to people who lacked a formal education or knowledge of foreign languages. Schubart's son Ludwig recalled that he often encountered 'inn keepers, waiters, apprentices, postilions, barbers, servants' who had memorised entire volumes of the *Chronik*.¹⁰ Schubart himself claimed that the publication, which was around eight pages long and generally published twice a week, had a circulation of 1,600.¹¹ Considering the common practice at the time of reading periodicals aloud in public spaces, such as

coffee-houses and taverns, or sharing them with acquaintances, the number of people with access to the journal was far greater. One scholar estimates that the *Chronik* may have been read by as many as 20,000 people throughout Germany and in places as far flung as London, Paris, Vienna and St Petersburg.¹² An important reason for this unusual degree of popularity was Schubart's style of writing. He composed much of the material in taverns such as the Walfisch in Augsburg and the Baumstark in Ulm. They served as major places of communication and exchange of news to broad segments of the population. Schubart thrived in this energetic and diverse environment. His son recalled that it took him no more than two hours to dictate the entire content of one issue.¹³ As a result, his writing was spontaneous, colloquial and witty. Moreover, in contrast to other editors, who too often shrank from publishing information that might have attracted the attention of censors, Schubart was less fearful of expressing his views. Indeed, he promised his readers in the first issue that, unlike the competition, his *Chronik* would not be timid and boring.¹⁴

First and foremost, Schubart saw himself as a German patriot committed to educating the German people about their nation.¹⁵ At the time the label 'Deutschland' ('Germany') included hundreds of separate sovereignties, ranging from numerous tiny states to a few large territories, including Prussia. Most of these territories, including Schubart's native state of Swabia as well as Württemberg, his journal's place of publication, belonged to the Holy Roman Empire. When Schubart spoke of Germany, he meant the German-speaking region of central Europe. When he referred to 'Vaterlandsstolz' ('patriotism'), he meant love for and loyalty to the Holy Roman Empire. Virtually all his political commentaries in the *Chronik*, including those related to British and American developments, ultimately aimed at instilling a sense of patriotism in his readers. Indeed, Schubart viewed developments in America as a manifestation of Enlightenment ideas that contrasted starkly with the feudal and despotic characteristics of most German territories. He hoped, perhaps naively, that his reports about Britain and America would inspire his German readers to strive for the creation of a more enlightened and liberty-loving society.

The link between German patriotism and British and American developments was evident in the very first issue of the *Chronik*, published in March 1774. It featured a celebratory essay about 'Deutschland', a topic that, Schubart promised, would always be his centre of attention.¹⁶ This was followed by a parable that contrasted the freedom of a wolf (England) with the 'Sklaverey' ('slavery') of a dog (Germany). At the heart of all of his writing was a love for liberty, represented first by England and, after the outbreak of hostilities, by the Americans, and a hatred of absolutism, the form of government that existed throughout much of the Holy Roman Empire. To Schubart, Britain's system of government, under which its subjects enjoyed fundamental liberties, among them freedom of the press, was far superior to that of most German territories. Britain thus served as the ideal foil against which Schubart could assess the state of German affairs. He frequently expressed critical observations about Germany, usually implicitly in comparisons with England. Moreover, the Americans' struggle against oppression demonstrated that people were not destined to be slaves, that it was possible to live without the rule of 'Volkspeiniger' ('tormenters of the people').¹⁷ Britain's conflict with its colonies, including, especially, the involvement of thousands of German troops in the war, offered Schubart a welcome opportunity to teach his readers a few lessons about what it meant to be a German patriot.

Within a few weeks of commencing publication, Schubart's attention began to shift from European to American developments. On 2 May 1774 he was still mostly concerned with European affairs. An essay under the heading 'Engelland', at the time a commonly used designation meaning 'land of angels', dealt with the possibility of a European war,

British trade and the popularity of Lord North. It did not mention the North American colonies.¹⁸ However, the lead essay in the next issue, published three days later, was titled 'Amerika'. It marked the first time that Schubart referred to British North America in the journal's pages.¹⁹

While Schubart was intensely curious about events in America, German-speaking Europeans generally remained largely unconcerned with developments in a distant place that seemed to have little bearing on their lives. In the spring of 1774 Schubart needed to convince his readers that this was an important and relevant topic. He therefore devoted the entire first essay on America to justify his shift away from Europe across the Atlantic to the American colonies. First, he suggested that the place was not as strange and unconnected to Europe as it seemed. On the contrary, the continent was inhabited by Europeans, who were turning a dark and wild place into an enlightened land. He predicted that 'nach einer so langen Barbarei' ('after such a long period of barbarism') enlightenment would finally come to America, primarily owing to the many Britons, French, Spanish, Portuguese and Germans who had settled there. Europeans were awakening the 'träge Geist der Nation' ('lazy spirit of the nation'); they were participating in the creation of a superior culture that was characterised by the printing and consumption of books, impressive agricultural expertise, martial vigour and religion.²⁰ Schubart believed that the colonists were the harbingers of a better, more enlightened, age for America and, ultimately, also for Europe.

Most importantly, the Americans were fiercely protective of their freedom. As evidence, Schubart included two pieces of fiction, one entirely the product of his imagination and the other based on a poem written two decades earlier by another man. Schubart presented the first item as a letter written by the inhabitants of Massachusetts. The message, which was directed at Britain, warned that any country that threatened their freedom would be met with the insurmountable resistance of hundreds of thousands of Americans. The simplistic image of the imperial struggle that pitted a people committed to preserving their liberty against a mother country determined to take it away remained central to Schubart's coverage of the imperial conflict until the summer of 1776.

Schubart also explained to his readers that the triumph of Enlightenment was accompanied by a decline of barbarism. He followed the invented letter from Massachusetts with the poem 'Der sterbende Indianer an seinen Sohn' ('The Dying Indian to His Son'). It was a version of a German-language poem that had appeared in Christian Heinrich Schmid's *Anthologie der Deutschen* in 1772, which in turn was based on Joseph Wharton's 'The Dying Indian', published in 1758.²¹ Wharton's poem evoked the death of the great Inca civilisation, while Schubart memorialised the decline of the North American Indian. In the poem the Native American father reminds his son to remain as bold and free as him. However, the poem's main purpose was not to celebrate the Indians' courage or attachment to freedom. Schubart's Native American is proud and defiant, but he is also cruel and bloodthirsty. In a violent image that hardly evoked sympathy in European readers, the father presents his son with a wreath made of the hair and teeth of Christians. To Schubart, the death of the Indian signals the end of a violent and uncivilised age. He used the poem to highlight the decline of the 'barbarische Nationen' ('barbarian nations'), as he called Native Americans.

Schubart's inclusion of the letter from Massachusetts and the poem of the dying Indian in his first essay on 'Amerika' were intended to represent the transformation of America from an uncivilised into an enlightened place. Although Schubart generally condemned Christian colonisers for their cruel treatment of people in the colonies, including India and America, he nevertheless welcomed their achievements.²² Freedom-loving European

Christians were triumphing over uncivilised barbarians. He challenged his readers to be concerned with American developments not only because Germans were participating in this momentous transformation, but also because America could serve as a model for Europe. For Schubart, the colonists' struggle against Britain was an almost inevitable continuation of the Europeans' triumph over the Native Americans. They were forging ahead on the path towards an enlightened society. The news from America, Schubart exclaimed with excitement, 'weissagen schon die Morgenröthe eines sehr heiteren Sommertages' ('prophesy the dawn of a very pleasant summer day').²³

Schubart's commitment to provide his readers with news from America was hampered by two factors. First, German editors found it difficult to procure reliable information about foreign affairs, in particular, a distant place such as America. At the time not a single German publication had a permanent correspondent in America. Editors were forced to rely on news printed in other publications, including especially British, French and Dutch newspapers and periodicals. They only occasionally received correspondence from America that included newsworthy information. Although it is impossible to identify with certainty Schubart's sources of information about American developments, it is probable that he obtained the bulk from other periodicals and newspapers. He subscribed to around twenty-five newspapers, and on occasion identified the source of his information in the *Chronik*.²⁴

Another, more serious, hindrance to reliable and candid political reporting in Germany was posed by strict censorship laws. With few exceptions, such as Baden and Hanover, the rulers of territories throughout German-speaking Europe required editors to present their material to censors for approval prior to publication. Failure to comply could result in fines, imprisonment and loss of publishing privileges. 'Safe' news items included reports that lacked commentary and interpretation or that had appeared in reputable foreign and domestic papers. The idea was to keep news coverage as neutral as possible.²⁵ Schubart repeatedly complained that candid observations about German rulers in the German-language press were rare, and critical commentary about domestic issues virtually non-existent. Readers of German publications, he wrote in December 1774, had to believe that Germany was ruled by 'Göttern, Seraphims and Cherubims' ('Gods, Seraphim and Cherubs').²⁶ The restrictions under which German editors laboured contrasted sharply with the freedom enjoyed by their English colleagues. As Schubart put it in late 1774, 'Ein Schreiber einer Abendzeitung in England sagt Sachen laut, die man in Deutschland kaum denken darf' ('the editor of a newspaper in England says things out loud that one is barely allowed to think in Germany').²⁷

The difficulty for German editors to express themselves freely was particularly frustrating for editors such as Schubart, whose opinions often challenged, directly or indirectly, the views and policies of their rulers. He disdained his colleagues whose writing was submissive, uncritical and simply boring. However, printing opinion and commentary that might be seen as critical was dangerous. Schubart experienced the power of the censors at first hand shortly after commencing with the publication of the *Chronik*. After only a few issues he was forced to relocate his periodical from Augsburg to Ulm as a result of pressures from the local censor. In the face of such restrictions he used a variety of literary techniques to protect himself.²⁸ For example, he often presented his political views in the form of animal fables, as he did in the very first issue. He also disguised his opinion as letters from correspondents, fictional dialogues, songs and poetry. Every issue of the *Chronik* serves as a reminder that Schubart was a journalist and a poet; the *Chronik* was a political as much as a literary journal. He also presented reports as rumours, offered contradictory information or included commentary on events that had taken place in a

foreign land. In fact, by the summer of 1775 Schubart noted happily that the most interesting news was coming from Africa and America, 'denn je weiter sich eine Begebenheit zuträgt; je freyer darf man darüber urteilen' ('for the farther away an event takes places, the more freely one can comment about it').²⁹ In his reports on America, Schubart was able to articulate certain ideas that would have caused him problems with the censors if he had uttered them in connection with European affairs.³⁰

Although Schubart was an early and enthusiastic observer of the developments in America, the outbreak of hostilities between England and its colonists dismayed him. It came as a shock to him that Britain, the powerful champion of liberty, was oppressing the rights of its own subjects.³¹ In his view the colonists were defending precisely those Enlightenment principles of equality and freedom that characterised England, the 'Insel der Freyheit' ('island of liberty').³² From the start, he blamed Britain's unwise policies towards its colonies for the conflict. He repeatedly noted that England's treatment of the colonists was arrogant, stupid and 'unpolitisch' ('unpolitical'). He did not enlighten his readers about the colonists' grievances, nor did he explain the nature of Britain's allegedly oppressive policies. His notion of freedom also remained vague, although liberty of the press certainly was a major component. Instead, he suggested that the leniency of the British administration had allowed the colonies to grow too powerful.³³ It was a largely unpolitical interpretation, which regarded Britain as a parent trying to exert control over a child after years of indulgence. Schubart had little sympathy for Britain's treatment of its American subjects. It was only natural that they resisted the oppressive policies of the mother country. 'Der Mensch und der Christ muss über das Betragen der Engländer zürnen' ('Men and Christians had to be enraged about the behaviour of the English'), he wrote in August 1774.³⁴ Like other German intellectuals, Schubart described the imperial crisis as a kind of spiritual contest between liberty and oppression rather than a political event.³⁵

In the summer of 1774 Schubart predicted that the 'courageous Bostonians' were about to throw off 'die Fesseln der Knechtschaft, und sich selbst regieren' ('the shackles of servitude and rule themselves').³⁶ He did not yet appreciate the causes of the conflict, nor did he consider what kind of political system the Americans might be trying to establish. He knew, however, that theirs would be a better, freer kind of society. In the autumn of 1774 he offered his readers a tale that reflected his hopeful, almost utopian, view of America as the seat of liberty: the Goddess of Freedom, accompanied by her sisters Justice and Virtue, had descended to earth to visit the altars that had been erected in their honour. Their search at the courts, among the people, and even in the republics of Europe, was in vain; instead of a true love of liberty they found disorder, party spirit, nepotism and the oppression of human rights. Finally, Schubart writes, the sisters had settled in Boston, where, he promised his readers in a footnote, the complete history of freedom would soon appear.³⁷ The spirit of liberty was deserting England, its last bastion in Europe. By April 1775 the North American colonies had become the 'Provinzen der Freyheit' ('provinces of liberty').³⁸

Until the summer of 1776 the image of the liberty-loving colonists who were bravely defending themselves from oppression figured prominently in the *Chronik's* coverage of the conflict. On 10 August 1775, two weeks before King George issued the proclamation that declared the colonies to be in a state of rebellion, Schubart published his famous 'Freiheitslied eines Kolonisten' ('freedom song of a colonist').³⁹ The poem contrasted the noble, free Americans with the slavish and weak Europeans, who were being oppressed by tyrannical rulers. The brave Americans were led by the Goddess of Freedom, while Europe's leaders were sending 'Europens Sklaven' ('Europe's slaves') into battle like cattle

destined for slaughter. Schubart reiterated this interpretation of the war as a struggle between freedom and tyranny in an essay published in October 1775. The conflict, he wrote, was best described as 'Die Freyheit im Kampfe für ihre heiligen Rechte' ('liberty in the struggle for its holy rights') against the 'Königssklaven' ('king's slaves').⁴⁰

Schubart's admiration for the Americans' dedication to the cause of liberty did not mean that he supported a similar uprising in Europe. Indeed, he never openly condoned or even encouraged the people to rise up against their rulers, even if they had legitimate grievances. Schubart's theoretical, rather than practical, support for revolution is reflected in an essay that contrasted the American revolutionary movement with the Bohemian uprising of 1775.⁴¹ Earlier that year the peasantry of Bohemia, a territory within the Holy Roman Empire, had responded to extremely high taxation as well as rumours that the lords were deliberately keeping from them certain measures designed to offer relief by marching towards Prague and the interior country in order to gain support for their cause.⁴² Empress Maria Theresa sent in the military to put down the uprising. Schubart approved of the decision to use force against the peasants, arguing that they had been motivated by foolhardiness rather than a feeling for freedom. They were irrational and disorderly 'Rebellen' ('rebels') fighting against their benevolent rulers, including the enlightened absolutist Emperor Joseph, Maria Theresa's son and co-ruler.

In contrast, Schubart explained, the label 'rebels' did not apply to the 'grossmüthige Amerikanische Volk' ('noble American nation').⁴³ They were driven by a wise and moderate spirit of liberty grounded in natural rights. They were defending themselves against oppression and exploitation. For example, Britain had denied them representation in Parliament despite the great economic benefits it had derived from them. In fact, the rich in America, Schubart claimed, had fewer rights than the poor in Britain; the mother country treated the prosperous colonies like a conquered province. That such poor treatment enraged the colonists was not surprising. Their calls for resistance were the result of long-standing grievances against a despotic government. And their actions were entirely orderly. They held 'Congresse, aber keine polnischen Reichstäge' ('Congresses, but not Polish diets'), by which he meant that their protests were well organised and wise rather than unruly and chaotic.⁴⁴ Schubart contrasted the 'Bürgerkrieg' ('civil war') in America with the Bohemian peasant uprising of 1775 to clarify the distinction between legitimate resistance and unlawful rebellion. He described the Americans as a 'Volk, das unter der Fahne der Freiheit ficht' ('a people that is fighting under the banner of liberty').⁴⁵ Their resistance to British rule was a legitimate response to oppression.

Until the outbreak of hostilities in April 1775 Schubart was hopeful that Britain would find the wisdom to deal with the colonies in an enlightened manner: that is, protect their freedom and avoid war. But over the course of the year evidence of Britain's despotism was mounting as proof of the natural affinity of Americans for freedom was increasing. The clearest indication of Britain's commitment to put down the rebellion by force was the rumour that it intended to hire foreign troops against the Americans. These plans posed a painfully challenging dilemma for the German sympathiser of the American revolutionary movement.

In May 1775, eight months before the first subsidy treaties between Britain and several German princes were concluded, Schubart reported Britain's plan to hire troops from Hessen and Braunschweig.⁴⁶ This marked the first time that a German editor mentioned these plans in writing. Schubart may have heard rumours about Britain's intentions, or he may have simply assumed that Britain would do what it had done many times before in times of crisis: hire German subsidy troops. Since the late seventeenth century Britain had employed German troops on multiple occasions to help defend British interests in Britain

and on the continent, including during the Seven Years War.⁴⁷ Given that King George did not commence official negotiations with the rulers of several German territories until the autumn of 1775, Schubart's report is remarkably early, and accurate. Hessen and Braunschweig were the first two German territories to enter into subsidy treaties with Britain.

Over the next few months Schubart printed numerous reports about Britain's plans to employ German troops. Since he generally lacked reliable sources for information, he often cautioned his readers about the uncertainty of the stories or presented conflicting information about an event. Indeed, some of his reports turned out to be mistaken. In July 1775, for example, he wrongly announced that ten German regiments had received orders to embark for passage to America, via England.⁴⁸ A few weeks later, on the other hand, he accurately reported Britain's plans to send Hanoverians to the Mediterranean. He printed this announcement fewer than two weeks after the Hanoverian minister Von Alvensleben had put his signature beneath the terms of hire.⁴⁹ His information, which included a list of the regiments destined for Gibraltar and Minorca, was unusually detailed and accurate.⁵⁰ Over all, however, Schubart struggled with providing his readers with reliable information about the war generally, and the German subsidy treaties specifically.

Despite the unreliability of the news, Schubart was convinced that Germans would be employed in the war against the Americans several months before the first subsidy treaties were actually signed. In fact, he was certain that Britain's use of German troops in the war against the Americans would not be restricted to a few hundred Hanoverians who would support the war in America indirectly. In the summer of 1775, five months before the first subsidy treaties were concluded, he reported that the rulers of several German territories, among them Braunschweig, Hessen-Kassel and Prussia, had agreed to furnish Britain with a total of 30,000 troops.⁵¹ At first, he erroneously reported that they would be stationed in Hanover. This assumption probably stemmed from the fact that German subsidy troops had never before been used outside Europe. In October, Schubart reported that Parliament was urging King George to hire foreign troops to fight against the colonists.⁵² By this time he knew that German troops were destined for America, even though he continued to be mistaken about their places of origin.⁵³ Prussia, for example, did not enter into subsidy treaties with Britain. Schubart also repeatedly announced, wrongly, that the German territory of Württemberg as well as Russia was sending troops to America.⁵⁴ Despite such contradictions and errors, he correctly reported before any other German editor that large numbers of German troops were going to enter British service to fight in America. And he was determined to share with his readers everything he knew about 'was unsre muthige Antipoden drunten machen' ('what our brave antipodes are doing down there').⁵⁵

Ultimately, the German territories that entered into subsidy treaties with Britain were Braunschweig, Hessen-Kassel, Hessen-Hanau, Waldeck, Ansbach-Bayreuth and Anhalt-Zerbst. In exchange for subsidy payments, they hired out as many as 38,000 troops for employment in America.⁵⁶ The entry of German troops into Britain's conflict with its American colonies radically changed the ways in which Schubart viewed and reported on the struggle. First, his coverage of the war increased substantially once the subsidy treaties had been signed, and especially after the first German troops had landed in North America. Not only did Schubart publish more items about America, but the information also became increasingly detailed, if not necessarily more reliable. In 1774 around twenty issues published during that year include information that related directly to England's crisis with its American colonies. The following year that number increased to around forty. During this early period of the war he paid far more attention to American affairs than any other German editor. For example, Wieland's *Teutscher Merkur*, considered to be

'the farthest-reaching, longest-lived journalistic undertaking of its epoch', published only a handful of items about North American developments between 1773 and 1777.⁵⁷ Beginning in early 1776, and throughout 1777, almost every issue of the *Chronik* contained news from America. At that point Schubart was primarily concerned with informing his readers about events and developments that directly involved the German troops.

However, before Schubart turned his attention to the impact of the entry of German troops on American developments, he considered its consequences for Germany. First and foremost, the decision of several German rulers to hire out their subjects to a foreign power for profit was a shamefully unpatriotic act that greatly endangered their territories. 'Hier ist ein Befehl aus London angekommen, der den Staatsgrüblern viel zu schaffen macht' ('An order arrived here from London that will distress the students of the affairs of state'), he wrote in the summer of 1775.⁵⁸ Thus began Schubart's announcement that five battalions of Hanoverians were to be sent to Gibraltar and Port Mahon in order to replace British troops that would then be sent to Boston. Schubart did not generally object to Britain's planned use of Hanoverians in the Mediterranean. After all, as the Elector of Hanover, King George was using 'his' troops. However, Schubart was concerned about the potentially devastating consequences for German territories left vulnerable to foreign attack.⁵⁹ Indeed, Schubart's early reports of Britain's hire of troops from Hessen, Braunschweig, Prussia and even Russia wrongly assumed that they would be stationed in Hanover in order to protect it.⁶⁰ The war between Britain and its colonies thus threatened to entangle the German territories in foreign wars and, worse, exposed them to foreign invasion. He was certain that it was only a matter of time before France and Spain entered the conflict as American allies. This would turn a civil war fought in America into an international war fought primarily in Europe.⁶¹

Schubart also regretted that Germans were being drawn into a war on another continent. Until then, German subsidy troops had never been deployed outside Europe, nor had they been involved in a colonial war. Unlike many of its European neighbours, including Britain, France, Spain, Portugal and the United Provinces, the German territories did not have colonial possessions at that time. Schubart believed that Britain's legacy in its colonies, including India, was marked by greed, tyranny and cruelty. It had already built 'Schandsäulen' ('pillories') on four continents, and it was only a matter of time before it erected a 'Monument von Menschenknochen' ('monument of human bones') in America. Although Schubart did not explain the nature of these atrocities, he strongly condemned Britain's oppression and exploitation of its colonial subjects. 'Gott lob, dass kein solcher Fluch auf uns Deutschen ruht!' ('Thank God that such a curse does not rest upon us Germans!'), he wrote in August 1775.⁶² Now, for the first time, German troops were about to be hired to defend a foreign nation's colonial possessions on another continent. Schubart warned that their participation in the American war would make them complicit in the oppression of a foreign people.

That German troops were employed to fight against liberty further dismayed Schubart. Given his sympathies for the Americans, it is not surprising that he was very critical of the decision by several German rulers to hire out their troops in a war against people fighting to preserve their freedom. He applauded the decision of other European territories to deny Britain the use of their troops. In the autumn of 1775 King George had asked William V of Orange, the Stadtholder of the United Provinces of the Netherlands, to loan him the so-called Scots Brigade for use in America.⁶³ Britain had moved the brigade to Holland in the late sixteenth century, when it helped the Dutch in their struggle to gain independence from Spain. By the time of the king's request, the brigade had been in the United Provinces for close to two hundred years.⁶⁴ After prolonged debates the States-General, a kind of

parliament in which each of the seven provinces had one vote, denied the king's request in the spring of 1776. The most influential of the statements supporting the refusal to let Britain use the brigade was written by the representative Baron Joan Derk van der Capellen tot den Pol.⁶⁵

With evident admiration Schubart printed excerpts from Cappellen's passionate memorial. It gave as a key reason for the refusal to support Britain the fear that the war threatened to engulf Europe in flames. Moreover, it accused Britain of a long history of enriching itself at the expense of other European powers. Capellen's anger about Britain's disrespect for its neighbours, including its allies, resonated with Schubart, who also repeatedly complained that Britain's behaviour towards its European neighbours, including the German territories, was selfish and arrogant. The Dutch were standing up to British mistreatment by refusing to aid them with troops in the war against the Americans. To Schubart, the Dutch patriotism and spirit of freedom contrasted starkly with the apathy with which Germans responded to the treaties of their rulers. He could hardly fathom the 'Kaltblütigkeit, womit wir's ansehen, dass der Kern teutscher Soldaten jetzt über's Meer schwimmt, um Leuten, die sie nie beleidigt haben, den Schedel neinzuschlagen' ('the cold-bloodedness with which we are watching how the core of the German soldiers are crossing the ocean in order to crush the skulls of people who have never insulted them').⁶⁶ Schubart was distressed that there was no public outcry over what he saw as an unpatriotic act by despotic rulers that endangered the German territories. Why, he asked, 'sollen Deutsche als Knechte dienen!!!' ('shall Germans serve as minions!!!').⁶⁷

Schubart's answer to this question was, for the most part, because of the greed of their rulers. They were hiring out their subjects for subsidies to be paid directly to them; generally, the more soldiers they supplied, the greater the profits. Schubart explained the bargain in a biting sarcastic essay in March 1776, under the heading 'Hier ist eine Probe der neusten Menschenschätzung!' ('here is a sample of the newest appraisal of humans!'). The landgrave of Hessen-Kassel, for example, received an annual subsidy of 45,000 Thaler for his 12,000 brave Hessians, 'die grösstenteils in Amerika ihr Grab finden werden' ('most of whom will find their grave in America'). Similarly, the duke of Braunschweig was paid for supplying around 4,300 men, few of whom Schubart expected to return to their fatherland.⁶⁸ The German rulers were selfishly selling their own subjects to a foreign nation, weakening Germany in the process. The subsidy treaties, Schubart concluded, were 'ein furchtbarer Text für Patrioten, denen's Herz pocht, wenn Mitbürger das Schicksal der Negersklaven haben, und als Schlachtopfer in fremde Welthen verschickt werden' ('a terrible text for patriots, whose hearts pound, when compatriots share the fate of negro slaves, and are sent as human sacrifices into foreign realms'). The subsidy treaties served as a powerful example of the despotism of certain German rulers as well as the tendency of the German people to be timid, weak and unpatriotic.

However, Schubart did not just blame an apathetic public and greedy rulers for sending thousands of Germans into the American war. He also targeted the troops themselves. Indeed, entirely absent from Schubart's coverage of the war is a claim that soon became central to indictments of the German subsidy treaties: that the German troops were pressed into service. On the contrary, according to Schubart, many German men were actually volunteering for British service. Thousands of German 'Müssigmacher' ('idlers'), he noted in early 1776, were clamouring to go to America.⁶⁹ In April 1776 a letter from London reported that the city was crowded with people of the lowest ranks from all nations who were eager to seek their fortune in America. Many of this assortment of adventurers were Germans who were desperate to find employment in British service.⁷⁰ Although the German rulers bore some responsibility for pushing their subjects to go to

Britain by depriving them of economic opportunities at home, Schubart regarded the men's decision as further evidence of the sorry state of German patriotism. That Germans would sign up to fight in a foreign war against a freedom-seeking people suggested that they were naturally inclined to be slaves.⁷¹ Their evident lack of desire for freedom was pathetic. Could it be true, Schubart asked, 'dass unsre Krieger blos um niedern Sold gedungne Sklaven sind?' ('that our warriors are nothing more than slaves hired for meagre pay?').⁷²

A poem published in the *Chronik* in June 1776 was particularly explicit in its criticism of German troops destined for America. Here the German soldier in British service was depicted as a free man who was voluntarily enslaving himself to an oppressive and arrogant foreign power. Under the heading 'Gebeugter Vaterlandsstolz' ('humbled patriotism'), Schubart reminded his readers that a German patriot would never give up his freedom, family and fatherland to fight for foreign pay:

Ein Deutscher ist ein braver Mann,
Ficht nicht für fremden Sold.
Für Freyheit, väterliche Flur,
Für Weib und Kinder ficht er nur
Und nicht für sklavisch Sold.

(A German is a brave man,
He does not fight for foreign pay.
He only fights for freedom, fatherland,
For wife and children,
And not for slavish pay.)⁷³

Schubart, in the voice of a soldier's father, went so far as to hope that his son would be shipwrecked before he could take up his sword in the fight against the Americans. The poem constituted an appeal to German men to defend their own nation and the principle of freedom rather than foreign interests and tyranny. The participation of German troops in the American war was humiliating to the entire German nation. 'Ein freyer, teutscher Mann' ('a free German man'), the poem concluded, was serving the 'Stolz, dem Geiz der Britten' ('the pride, the greed of the British').

Despite his general outrage over the treaties, Schubart reported Britain's plan to hire German troops in the war against its own subjects with some satisfaction. The decision at once revealed British weakness and German bravery, both of which Britain was reluctant to acknowledge. Beginning in the autumn of 1775, Schubart's descriptions of Britain were rapidly changing from deferential and admiring to contemptuous and disparaging.⁷⁴ Evidently, Britain could not put down the rebellion without German assistance. Parliament, he wrote in October 1775, was determined to counter colonial stubbornness with German courage.⁷⁵ Indeed, this was not the first time that Britain required the aid of Germans. Schubart reminded his readers of William Pitt's remark in the early 1760s that 'Amerika ist mitten in Teutschland erobert worden' ('America was conquered in the middle of Germany').⁷⁶ One of the most powerful and enlightened nations in the world needed Germans to fight its wars and enlarge its empire. Schubart predicted that, 'bald wird der Engelländer Amerika zum zweytenmal den Teutschen zu verdanken haben' ('soon the Englishmen will owe America to the Germans for the second time').⁷⁷ Britain's hire of German troops was as humiliating for Britain as it was flattering for Germany. Ironically, as Schubart described the subsidy treaties as shameful and unpatriotic, he also used them to bolster German pride and patriotism.

The arrival of German troops in America in the summer of 1776 had a significant impact on Schubart's view of their participation in the war. Always a champion of freedom and enemy of despotism, he admired what the Americans were trying to accomplish. And yet, the involvement of tens of thousands of his compatriots on the side of their enemy complicated the situation. Support for the Americans meant betrayal of fellow Germans while loyalty to the German troops suggested the abandonment of the cause of freedom. He openly acknowledged his dilemma after the arrival of the first German troops in America in the summer of 1776, when he asked himself, and his readers, 'Soll man ihnen Glück wünschen oder nicht?' ('should one wish them luck or not?')⁷⁸

Ultimately, Schubart's loyalty lay first with the German nation and the German troops. Over the course of 1776 he gradually changed his focus from an attack on the subsidy treaties to a celebration of the German troops' courage. In the process his compatriots who were going to America were transformed from 'slaves' into 'heroes'. One turning point in Schubart's view of the war was the departure of the first German contingent from Europe for America, estimated by Schubart to number 30,000. The 'teutsches Heldenheer' ('army of German heroes'), he wrote with pride in May 1776, were on their way to the colonies. In contrast to the British, who had built a 'monument of human bones' in America, as he had put it in the summer of 1775, the Germans were about to erect 'ein ewiges Monument teutscher Tapferkeit' ('a permanent monument to German bravery').⁷⁹ Schubart continued to worry that the departure of German troops exposed their homes to the threat of foreign invasion, but his main focus now followed the troops from Europe to the battlefields of America. In these accounts he was primarily concerned with depicting the German troops as brave, honourable and indispensable to Britain's efforts to put down the rebellion. In October 1776, for example, he reported that the German General Philip von Heister, commander of the first division of Hessians, was a 'Wunder der Bravheit' ('miracle of bravery'), and that the British owed their victory at the battle of Long Island largely to him and his men.⁸⁰ Schubart also vehemently rejected reports of Hessian cowardice that emerged during the autumn as unfounded rumours. The most explicit defence of the German troops, tellingly titled 'Ehrenrettung unsrer deutschen Brüder in Amerika' ('rescue of honour of our German brothers in America'), rejected charges of German cruelty against their enemies as unfounded. Contrary to reports that denigrated the honour of the German troops, Schubart argued that their actions actually enhanced the reputation of the entire German nation in times of peace and war. He did not doubt that they behaved honourably, even in the most challenging of situations. In November 1776 he wrote with confidence, 'Ruft nun wieder laut, ihr Teutschen: Wir sind Menschen, auch im Krieg!' ('Once again shout out loud, you Germans: We are humans, even in war!').⁸¹

This uncritical celebration of German military exploits and honour was accompanied by an increasingly critical stance towards the Americans, including their military. Whereas prior to the arrival of German troops in America, Schubart had described the colonists as almost invincible defenders of liberty, they were now consistently depicted as shamefully weak and cowardly. Letters from German officers confirmed that they could not use their arms effectively and fled or surrendered at the first sight of the Germans.⁸² In light of such reports, Schubart doubted that the colonists would be able to defeat the British and German forces.

More significantly, Schubart's loyalty to the German troops compelled him to question whether the Americans were deserving of victory. He justified his diminishing support for the Americans by reconsidering his previous claim that American resistance to their king was a legitimate defence against an oppressive government. In the autumn of 1776 he introduced a more critical view in several fictitious dialogues that depicted colonial resis-

tance as an act of rebellion towards a generous and indulgent monarch rather than a valiant struggle of a liberty-loving people against tyranny.⁸³ With these dialogues Schubart offered his readers a viewpoint that allowed them, and him, to remain loyal to the German troops without abandoning the cause of liberty. The reinterpretation of the Americans as rebels, as one of the dialogues suggested, cast their resistance as illegitimate.⁸⁴ Schubart introduced this critical stance through works of fiction; it is important to note that he never explicitly condemned the Americans for their actions. However, his coverage certainly suggested an increasingly sceptical view that contrasted with the uncritical admiration with which he had viewed the colonists and their cause in the period before the arrival of the German troops in America. Until then, his celebration of the American struggle had been almost boundless, as had his criticism of Britain and those tyrants who 'sold' their subjects into British service. But, first and foremost, Schubart was a German patriot. Once the German troops entered the war on the side of Britain, he could no longer hope for the triumph of the colonists over their enemies. This critical view of the Americans allowed Schubart to hope for the military triumph of his compatriots without abandoning his love of freedom and hatred of tyranny.

The *Deutsche Chronik* offers a wealth of information that sheds light on the ways in which German-speaking Europeans viewed Britain's conflict with its North American colonies. Its editor, Schubart, was one of the most enthusiastic supporters of the revolutionary movement, and he was eager to inform his readers about American developments, primarily because he hoped to inspire them to strive for the creation of a more enlightened German society. However, the participation of thousands of German troops in the war on the British side had important consequences for the ways in which he described the colonists' struggle with Britain. Given that Schubart laboured under strict censorship laws, it is possible that his increasingly critical view of the Americans after the Germans entered the war stemmed at least partly from fear of punishment.⁸⁵ At the same time, from the outset Schubart interpreted the War of American Independence from the perspective of a German patriot hoping to promote a feeling of 'Vaterlandsstolz', or love of fatherland, among his German readers. Although he initially championed the Americans' cause as just and noble, he could not wish for their triumph over the German troops in battle. Ultimately, the participation of German soldiers in the war compelled Schubart to introduce to his readers an alternative interpretation of the American people that presented them not as valiant defenders of freedom but, rather, as cowardly rebels against an essentially benevolent government.

NOTES

1. Horst Dippel, *Germany and the American Revolution, 1770-1800: A Sociohistorical Investigation of Late Eighteenth-Century Political Thinking* (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 1977).

2. Among the most useful studies by literary scholars are: James T. Hatfield and Elfrida Hochbaum, 'The Influence of the American Revolution upon German Literature', *America Germanica* 3 (1900), p.338-85; John A. Walz, 'The American Revolution and German Literature', *Modern Language Notes* 16 (1901), p.225-31; Henry Safford King, *Echoes of the American Revolution in German Literature* (Berkeley, CA: University of California, 1929); Alexander Ritter (ed.), *Deutschlands Literarisches Amerikabild: Neuere Forschungen zur Amerikarezeption der Deutschen Literatur* (Hildesheim: Georg Olms, 1977) and Wynfried Kriegleder, *Vorwärts in die Vergangenheit: Das Bild der USA im deutschsprachigen Roman von 1776-1855* (Tübingen: Stauffenberg Verlag Brigitte Narr, 1999), esp. Ch. 1.

3. Exceptions include: Elisha P. Douglass, 'German Intellectuals and the American Revolution', *William & Mary Quarterly* 17 (1960), p.200-18; Ellis Shookman, 'Attitudes to North America in Wieland's *Teutscher Merkur*', *Journal for Eighteenth-Century Studies* 34:1 (2011), p.81-100; Roland Krebs and Jean Moes, *La Révolution Américaine vue par les périodiques de langue allemande, 1773-1783* (Paris: Didier-Erudition et Université de Metz, 1992), which includes Jean Clédière 'La *Deutsche Chronik* de Christian Daniel Friedrich Schubart et la Révolution

Americaine', p.137-46; Uwe Handke, 'Christian Martin Wieland als politischer Journalist: Die amerikanische Revolution im Spiegel des "Teutschen Merkur"', *Wieland-Studien* 3 (1996), p.150-60; Michael Myers, *Für den Bürger: The Role of Christian Schubart's 'Deutsche Chronik' in the Development of a Political Sphere* (New York: Peter Lang, 1990), esp. Ch. 4. Older studies are Herbert Percival Gallinger, *Die Haltung der Deutschen Publizistik zu dem amerikanischen Unabhängigkeitskrieg* (Leipzig: Oswald Schmidt, 1900); John A. Walz, 'Three Swabian Journalists and the American Revolution [Friedrich Schiller, Ludwig Wekhrin, Schubart]', *Americana Germanica* 4:2 (1902), p.95-129, 267-91, continued in *German-American Annals* 1 (1902-1903), p.209-24, 257-74, 347-56, 406-19, 593-600; Guy Stanton Ford, 'Two German Publicists on the American Revolution [August Ludwig von Schlözer, Schubart]', *Journal of English and German Philology* 8 (1909), p.145-76.

4. Dippel, *Germany and the American Revolution*, p.29. His discussion of periodicals is at p.24-30.

5. Bernd Jürgen Warneken, *Schubart: Der Unbürgerliche Bürger* (Frankfurt am Main: Eichborn Verlag, 2009), p.135. In 1776 Schubart changed the name of the journal to *Teutsche Chronik*. The most useful studies of Schubart, including especially his journalistic activities, include: Warneken, *Schubart*; Wilfried F. Schoeller, *Schubart: Leben und Meinungen eines schwäbischen Rebellen* (Berlin: Verlag Klaus Wagenbach, 1979); Hartmut Müller, *Postgaul und Flügelross: Der Journalist Christian Friedrich Daniel Schubart (1739-1791)* (New York: Peter Lang, 1985); and Myers, *Für den Bürger*.

6. Joachim Kirchner, *Das Deutsche Zeitschriftenwesen: seine Geschichte und seine Probleme*, vol. I (Wiesbaden: Otto Harrassowitz, 1958-1962), p.132 ('[Die Chronik] kann als Musterbeispiel des erwachten politischen Bewusstseins einer neuen Generation angeführt werden'). See also Margot Lindemann, *Die Deutsche Presse bis 1815*, vol. I (Berlin: Colloquium Verlag, 1969), p.201.

7. The *Chronik* was continued under various editors until 1781; however, it lacked the distinct voice of its founder during this period. Schubart resumed publication of the *Chronik* in 1787, after his release from prison, and continued it until his death in 1791.

8. The impact of Britain's use of German troops in the war on Schubart's views is examined in Myers, *Für den Bürger*, p.187-95. Myers correctly notes Schubart's shifting views of the conflict. However, he does not explore them within the context of Schubart's fervent patriotism, and, although he includes many quotes from the *Chronik*, his analysis of them is limited. Warneken, *Schubart*, p.154-7, acknowledges Schubart's increasingly ambivalent view of the Americans, but his selective reading from the *Chronik* leads him to conclude that Schubart retained his pro-American view even after the arrival of the first German troops in America. Clédière underestimates the significance of Schubart's patriotism generally and the British-German subsidy treaties specifically, on Schubart's views of the American developments in his 'La *Deutsche Chronik* de Christian Daniel Friedrich Schubart et la Révolution Américaine'. In *Postgaul und Flügelross*, p.71, 78-9, 83, Müller mentions Schubart's references to America only in passing and he does not refer to the participation of German soldiers in the war. Finally, none of these studies includes English translations of material quoted from the *Chronik*.

9. Lindemann, *Die Deutsche Presse*, vol. I.183; Müller, *Postgaul und Flügelross*, p.57.

10. Müller, *Postgaul und Flügelross*, p.30.

11. Hans Kraus, 'Nachwort' ('postscript'), in *Deutsche Chronik, herausgegeben von Friedrich Daniel Schubart, Jahrgang 1774-Jahrgang 1777*, vol. IV (Heidelberg: Verlag Lambert Schneider, 1975), p.xxii. All quotations from the *Chronik* are from this four-volume edition: 1774 (vol. I); 1775 (vol. II); 1776 (vol. III); 1777 (vol. IV). Unless otherwise noted, all translations are mine.

12. Kraus, 'Nachwort' ('postscript'), in *Chronik*, vol. VI.xxiii. See also Warneken, *Schubart*, p.128; Müller, *Postgaul und Flügelross*, p.107. For distribution throughout Germany, see *Chronik* (1 September 1774), p.360.

13. Warneken, *Schubart*, p.119-24.

14. *Chronik* (31 March 1774), p.4. See also his 'Vorbericht' ('preface'), which preceded the first issue.

15. For a discussion of Schubart's pedagogical objectives, see Warneken, *Schubart*, p.113-33.

16. *Chronik* (31 March 1774), p.5.

17. *Chronik* (20 May 1776), p.322.

18. *Chronik* (2 May 1774), p.73. Schubart's use of 'Engelland' was consistent with German practice at the time. By the late eighteenth century 'England' began to be used more frequently.

19. *Chronik* (5 May 1774), p.81.

20. *Chronik* (5 May 1774), p.81.

21. Christian Heinrich Schmid, *Anthologie der Deutschen* 3 (1772), p.330-1, Wharton, 'The Dying Indian', in Geoffrey Tillotson, Paul Fussell Jr and Marshall Waingrow (eds), *Eighteenth-Century English Literature* (New York: Harcourt, Brace Jovanovich, 1969), p.929-30.

22. See, for example, *Chronik* (7 August 1775), p.500; (15 July 1776), p.449.

23. *Chronik* (5 May 1774), p.81.

24. At one time Schubart claimed he was using a few dozen newspapers as sources of information, *Chronik* (23 June 1774), p.197. At another he referred to using twenty newspapers, *Chronik* (21 November 1774), p.540. See also Müller, *Postgaul und Flügelross*, p.55, Warneken, *Schubart*, p.120, 140 and Myers, *Für den Bürger*, p.172-3.

25. Jürgen Wilke, 'Pressezensur im Alten Reich', in Wilhem Haefs and York-Gothart Mix (eds), *Zensur im Jahrhundert der Aufklärung: Geschichte-Theorie-Praxis* (Göttingen: Wallstein Verlag, 2007), p.27-44.

26. *Chronik* (22 December 1774), p.612.

27. *Chronik* (22 December 1774), p.612 (6 September 1775), p.82.

28. Warneken, *Schubart*, p.139-42.

29. *Chronik* (6 July 1775), p.425.
30. See also Kriegleder, *Vorwärts in die Vergangenheit*, p.54-5.
31. *Chronik* (2 May 1774), p.74.
32. *Chronik* (16 January 1775), p.33.
33. *Chronik* (15 June 1775), p.377.
34. *Chronik* (4 August 1774), p.292.
35. See, for example, Kriegleder, *Vorwärts in die Vergangenheit*, p.45; Warneken, *Schubart*, p.150.
36. *Chronik* (14 July 1774), p.242.
37. *Chronik* (10 November 1774), p.516-7; see also 4 September 1775, p.561.
38. *Chronik* (17 April 1775), p.245.
39. *Chronik* (10 August 1775), p.507-8.
40. *Chronik* (9 October 1775), p.643.
41. *Chronik* (4 September 1775), p.562-7.
42. Hugh LeCaine Agnew, *The Czechs and the Lands of the Bohemian Crown* (Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution Press, 2004), p.88-9.
43. *Chronik* (4 September 1775), p.565, 562.
44. *Chronik* (4 September 1775), p.564; see also Warneken, *Schubart*, p.153.
45. *Chronik* (4 September 1775), p.562.
46. *Chronik* (29 May 1775), p.341.
47. See J. A. Houlding, *Fit for Service: The Training of the British Army, 1715-1795* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1981), p.323, n.1; John Childs, 'The Army and the State in Britain and Germany in the Eighteenth Century', in John Brewer and Eckhart Hellmuth (eds), *Rethinking Leviathan: The Eighteenth Century State in Britain and Germany* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999), p.63-4; Rodney Atwood, *The Hessians: Mercenaries from Hessen-Kassel in the American Revolution* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1980), p.14-20.
48. *Chronik* (27 July 1775), p.475-6.
49. Ernst von dem Knesebeck, *Geschichte der churhannoverischen Truppen in Gibraltar, Minorca und Ostindien* (Hanover, 1845), p.9.
50. *Chronik* (24 August 1775), p.539.
51. *Chronik* (24 August 1775), p.540; (31 August 1775), p.555.
52. *Chronik* (26 October 1775), p.681.
53. *Chronik* (9 October 1775), p.643; (23 October 1775), p.674.
54. Britain tried, and ultimately failed, to secure Russian troops for the war in America. For a history of British-Russian subsidy treaties, and rumours of the planned use of Russians in America, see Inge Auerbach, *Die Hessen in Amerika, 1776-1783* (Darmstadt: Selbstverlag der Hessischen Historischen Kommission Darmstadt und der Historischen Kommission für Hessen, 1996), p.25-79. In the late 1780s Britain employed troops from Württemberg in South Africa. Schubart memorialised the so-called Württemberg Cape Regiment in his famous 'Schubarts Lied an die Württembergischen Truppen, die nach dem Cap der Guten Hoffnung gesandt worden' (1787). In the early 1790s Ludwig van Beethoven set the poem to music.
55. *Chronik* (17 August 1775), p.525.
56. Daniel Krebs, *A Generous and Merciful Enemy: Life for German Prisoners of War during the American Revolution* (Norman, OK: University of Oklahoma Press, 2013), p.24. The oft-cited number of 30,000 German subsidy troops who fought on the British side in North America dates to August Ludwig von Schlözer's estimates in 'Berechnung des Verlusts deutscher Truppen bei dem Amerikanischen Kriege', *Stats-Anzeigen* 6 (1784), p.521-2. See also Edward J. Lowell, *The Hessians and the Other German Auxiliaries of Great Britain in the Revolutionary War* ([1884] Williamstown, MA: Corner House, 1975), p.299-300.
57. See Ellis Shookman, 'Attitudes to North America in Wieland's *Teutscher Merkur*', *Journal for Eighteenth-Century Studies* 34:1 (2011), p.81-2.
58. *Chronik* (24 August 1775), p.539.
59. *Chronik* (26 October 1775), p.681; (7 March 1776), p.157.
60. *Chronik* (24 August 1775), p.540; (25 January 1776), p.61. As late as 25 April 1776 (p.270) he reported that Württemberger troops had been hired to protect Hessen.
61. *Chronik* (26 October 1775), p.682.
62. *Chronik* (7 August 1775), p.500.
63. James Ferguson (ed.), *Papers Illustrating the History of the Scots Brigade in the Service of the United Netherlands, 1572-1782*, vol. II (Edinburgh, 1899), p.470. See also Jan W. S. Nordholt, *The Dutch Republic and American Independence* (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 1982), p.19-21.
64. Ferguson (ed.), *Papers Illustrating the History of the Scots Brigade*, p.475.
65. For a brief summary of the debates surrounding the request, published in 1781, see [Jan Waagenar], *Vaderlandsche Historie, vervattende de Geschiedenissen der Vereenigde Nederlanden, uit egte Gedenkstukken onpartydig Zamengesteld*, vol. V (Amsterdam: Izaak de Jongh en Wynand Wynands, 1781), p.28-30.
66. *Chronik* (7 March 1776), p.154-6.
67. *Chronik* (7 March 1776), p.158.
68. *Chronik* (25 March 1776), p.194. In the essay Schubart erroneously claimed that Hanover, Mecklenburg and Bavaria were also sending troops to America.
69. *Chronik* (8 February 1776), p.92.

70. *Chronik* (4 April 1776), p.218; (18 April 1776), p.249. See also 26 October 1775, p.681.
71. See also *Chronik* (1 January 1776), p.6.
72. *Chronik* (18 April 1776), p.250.
73. *Chronik* (10 June 1776), p.374-6. Schubart attributed the poem to 'G** aus Koblenz'.
74. For Schubart's shift from an admiring to an increasingly critical view of Britain over the course of 1775, though without any mention of the subsidy treaties as a factor in this changing attitude, see also Clédière, 'La Deutsche Chronik', p.141-2.
75. *Chronik* (26 October 1775), p.681.
76. *Chronik* (22 August 1776), p.533. See also 29 August 1776, p.547.
77. *Chronik* (22 August 1776), p.533.
78. *Chronik* (13 June 1776), p.380.
79. *Chronik* (2 May 1776), p.283.
80. *Chronik* (24 October 1776), p.680; (28 October 1776), p.681.
81. *Chronik* (7 November 1776), p.706.
82. *Chronik* (19 August 1776), p.524; (6 January 1777), p.10.
83. *Chronik* (23 September 1776), p.601-5; (7 October 1776), p.633-5; (4 November 1776), p.697-9. See also Myers, *Für den Bürger*, p.192-4.
84. *Chronik* (19 August 1776), p.524; (7 October 1776), p.634.
85. Indeed, although the reasons for his imprisonment in the beginning of 1777 remain a matter of debate, it is perhaps not a coincidence that Karl Eugen of Württemberg ordered Schubart's arrest only days before he offered his troops to Britain: Myers, *Für den Bürger*, p.197.

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